So called Islamic Bangladesh!

Rape of a corpse: ⤵️

In Haluaghat, a 20-year-old honors student committed suicide on the 19th of this month.

After her death, an unnatural death case was filed at the Haluaghat Police Station, and her body was taken into police custody.

A man named Abu Sayeed, who had been working for about three years transporting bodies from Haluaghat Police Station to Mymensingh Medical College Morgue, was involved.

At first, he came to the morgue, left the body inside, locked the door, and left.

About half an hour later, Abu Sayeed returned, claiming he needed to complete the inquest report. He then raped the corpse and afterward fell asleep inside the morgue.

When the morgue attendant (the “dom”) later entered and found the lights off, he turned them on and discovered Abu Sayeed and another person sleeping there.

The attendant became suspicious upon seeing the body and informed the doctor.

After examination, the doctor confirmed signs of sexual assault on the corpse.

Two horrific events occurred here — first, a young woman took her own life; second, her body, while under official custody, was violated.

This incident reflects a deep systemic failure — even the dead are not safe in state custody.

The accused has since been arrested and has confessed. Cases have been filed both for the rape and for the desecration of a corpse.

The girl who took her own life out of despair and disgust toward the world — even after death, her body was raped.

How many more times must Bangladesh “reform” before its people learn even the basics of civilization?

Here, not even a corpse finds peace. Just imagine that.

Freedom for secular thought still eludes Bangladesh, a decade after blogger’s murder

The climate for freedom of secular thought in Bangladesh remains bleak a decade after religious zealots murdered blogger Avijit Roy as he left a literary festival in Dhaka, family members, researchers and human rights advocates said.

The killing of the Bangladeshi-born American citizen in February 2015 was the first in a spate of murders of secular writers and intellectuals at the hands of Muslim extremists that year and in 2016.

"The current atmosphere for secular thought in Bangladesh is absent. Ten years ago, the condition for secularthoughts was very bad," Abul Kashem Fazlul Huq, a retired professor at Dhaka University, told BenarNews.

"Blogger Avijit Roy was killed for promoting secular thoughts, my son Dipan was killed for publishing his book. What fault did they have," Kashem said, referring to his son, Faisal Arefin Dipan, who was fatally attacked in October 2015.

Ten years on, the South Asian country is still unsafe for the secular community because the threat from violent extremism remains alive despite last year’s fall of the authoritarian government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, according to observers.

It had cracked down hard on Islamic militants by launching a deadly counter-terrorism campaign in July 2016, in the wake of an overnight siege of the Holey Artisan café in Dhaka, where 24 people, many of them foreigners, were slaughtered by Muslim extremists.

But the Hasina government executed a “wrong” policy of countering militancy and terrorism that did not root out the problem, according to one researcher.

And its going on

When do the four British seasons dates officially begin?

With no official definitions of the duration of spring, summer, autumn and winter, how do we know when the british seasons dates begin or end?

Some meteorologists adopt a convention, for the purpose of presenting statistics, of grouping the twelve months of the year into four three-month seasons, for example March, April and May being taken as Spring.

The astronomical events closely related to the four uk seasons are the equinoxes and the solstices, and these have been used to define the British seasons dates astronomically.

The equinoxes occur in March and September when the Sun is edgewise to the Earth's axis of rotation so that everywhere on Earth has twelve hours of daylight and twelve hours of darkness.

Bending of light by the atmosphere (refraction) may extend the day by 5 to 10 minutes depending on location. Also, days are about 2 minutes longer because whilst it is 12 hours between the centre of the sun rising and setting, we count sunrise to be when the edge of the sun appears over the horizon, and sunset to be when the final part disappears below it.

The solstices occur in June and December when the Earth's axis is at its extreme tilt towards and away from the Sun, so at mid-day it appears at its highest in one hemisphere and its lowest in the other, giving the longest and shortest days respectively.

These four events repeat every tropical year (365 days, 5 hours, 49 minutes), so they become later by about six hours, or (if there has been an intervening leap day) earlier by about 18 hours, from one year to the next.

They are not equally spaced in the year, because the Earth's orbit around the Sun is elliptical, not circular. Their timings can be obtained from a range of websites.

Of course it is!

Two believers stand firm in their faith despite threats in Bangladesh

The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in Bangladesh continues to target believers from Muslim backgrounds, who face direct threats, social exclusion, economic boycott and constant pressure to renounce their faith. Yet in the midst of these challenges, courageous individuals like Masud* and Akram* stand as living testimonies of unwavering faith in Jesus Christ.  

Persecution intensifies for Masud and family 

Masud (38) lives in western Bangladesh with his wife and their five-year-old son. Many new believers in this context choose to keep their faith undercover, because they know the dangers they face – but Masud is desperate to share Jesus with the people in his community. He serves as a local evangelist, regularly worshipping God in the open yard of his house with five fellow house church members. 

“I know my Saviour will carry me through this storm.”

MASUD

Like many other converts from Islam, his first and most painful challenge was rejection by his own family. They pressured him to renounce his faith, but Masud refused and has continued to stand firm in his Christian beliefs.   

This pressure has only intensified recently – and it doesn’t just affect him. He couldn’t enrol his son in their local school because the people in his area were harassing him – even though he’s only five years old. Fearing further mistreatment, Masud enrolled him in a school near his in-laws’ home instead. His wife also faces harassment from other women in the community, who attempt to manipulate and pressure her because of Masud’s faith. 

His community have turned against him too. His neighbours constantly ridicule him for his faith, making daily life difficult. During Ramadan, when Islamic religious practices intensified, a government official who had been threatening Masud for months publicly declared that, if Masud did not renounce his faith before Eid, he would be beaten so brutally that his ‘flesh would be torn from his bones’.  

Masud: “I am not afraid of these threats” 

Following the threats, local Muslim leaders instructed people not to buy from his small medicine shop, significantly reducing his customers. Not only does he now live in fear, but he is also struggling financially as he tries to navigate these challenges while providing for his family.  

Masud shared, “Ever since I received Christ, I have faced countless persecutions and struggles, but these recent threats are by far the most intense. But still, I am not afraid of these threats, because I know my Saviour will carry me through this storm, just as He has done before.”   

Masud and his family are currently safe for now, but he requests prayers for the continued safety of his family and for strength from the Lord to endure.   

Akram’s sons used against him 

Masud and Akram don’t know each other, but they share similar stories. In south west Bangladesh, 81-year-old Akram has been a Christian for about 30 years. So have most of his family, except for two of his four sons, who are still Muslims. Recently, their neighbours have been using Akram’s Muslim sons to pressure the rest of the family to return to Islam, but they have not given in. 

“The pressure for Akram and his family is getting worse and increasing day by day.”

LOCAL CHURCH LEADER

“The pressure for Akram and his family is getting worse and increasing day by day,” shares one of Akram’s church leaders. “Previously, the local people destroyed Akram’s son’s shop, which was their only source of income for the whole family. And now, the neighbours have even offered Akram that, if he renounces his faith and returns to Islam, they will rebuild his shop and will give him back everything that was lost – but Akram remained faithful in the Lord.”   

After that incident, an arbitration meeting was called in the police station among the local Muslims and Christian converts (including Akram’s family). On that day, the police told the Muslims not to disturb nor persecute the Christians. Unfortunately, the Muslims didn’t listen to the police and are still persecuting and pressuring coverts.   

Open Doors local partners are supporting Akram and his family in prayer and looking for other ways to help them. Please pray for them – and for all believers who have to make difficult choices about sharing their faith and the risk of persecution that comes with it. 

Source: https://www.opendoorsuk.org/news/latest-news/bangladesh-masud-akram/

Christians in Bangladesh fear rise of Islamist groups

with the guard of armed forces in the south Asin nation. Bangladesh Army on duty at St. Mary’s Cathedral Church, Dhaka on Dec. 23, 2024. (Credit: Stephan Uttom Rozario.)

With the elections looming in Bangladesh and the rise of Islami fundamentalism, the Catholic community in the Muslim-majority Central Asian nation is living in fearing persecution.

Before and after previous elections, religious minorities have been subjected to persecution.

In Bangladesh, the ruling Awami League fell in a student-led uprising on August 5, 2024, and the autocratic Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled the country.

Since then, the country has seen the rise of Islamic fundamentalists. For this reason, there is fear among the Christian community that they may be persecuted in the run-up to the national elections in February next year.

Even 25 years after the bombing of our church that killed 10 Catholic believers, we have not got justice yet, nor has any charge sheet been filed for the attack,” said Premananda Haldar, a 48-year-old Catholic.

In 2001, a bomb attack took place during Sunday Mass at Most Holy Redeemer Church in the southern district of Gopalganj, killing 10 and injuring over 50 Catholics.

Premananda Haldar’s younger brother, Suman Haldar, was killed in the attack at the age of 24. Of the 10 dead, 7 were under 30.

Haldar said that there has never been justice after attacks on minority Christians in Bangladesh.

“It has been 25 years since the bomb attack; a new church building has been built in place of the old church. We are also practicing our religion, but the loud sound of that bomb constantly rings in our ears, and the image of that brother’s gruesome body flashes before our eyes,” Haldar said.

In Bangladesh, it is said in politics that religious minorities vote for the Awami League, and when it wins, the opposition attacks. However, when the Awami League loses, they think that the minorities have lost because they did not vote, and minorities are still attacked.

For the Christian minorities, most of the attacks have occurred when the Awami League was in power.

Recently, after the Awami League was ousted, the rise of hardline Islamists is visible in the country, and the higher authorities say this could be a big threat to the Catholic Church.

In July, 11 teachers of Mymensingh Notre Dame College protested for various demands, including their promotion, change in service rules, increase in provident fund, and promotion from lecturer to assistant professor. At one stage of this protest, the college was forced to close classes.

College Principal Holy Cross Father Thadeus Hembrom said this movement is not just a movement to achieve demands.

“They have a hidden agenda behind their movement, otherwise 50 teachers of the college would have protested but only 11 teachers are protesting. Our Catholic institutions are doing well and gaining a good reputation. That is why they are protesting to destroy Catholic institutions,” Hembrom said.

“I think what happened to my family is actually part of God’s plan. So, I am living my life with full faith in God and will continue to do so,” the priest said.

On July 28, vandals s cut down about 3,000 betel trees of the Khasi indigenous of Pratappur Punjee (Khasi Village) in Sylhet district. The only way for the Khasi Catholic to earn money is this betel, which is used in traditional medicine. But the Khasi say that the only way for them to make a living is by cutting down the betel trees and trying to evict them from this place.

“The influential people of the local religious majority Muslim community want to evict us from this place and take it over. They want to expand tea gardens here. That is why they are oppressing us,” said Khasi leader Welcome Lamba.

“We are afraid of the upcoming elections. Because, before and after the elections, we have been subjected to many injustices and this time there is a greater possibility of it. So, we are constantly praying to God to protect us,” Lamba said.

The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC) annual report on violence against religious and ethnic minorities recorded over 1,000 cases of human rights violations in a year.

The interreligious forum’s findings are based on media reports from July 2023 to June 2024. During this period, 45 members of minority communities were murdered and there were 10 attempted murders and 36 death threats.

The report also recorded 102 acts of vandalism, looting and arson against homes and businesses belonging to minority communities.

As Bangladesh Reinvents Itself, Islamist Hard-Liners See an Opening

A brewing shift toward religious conservatism has emerged from the political vacuum in this country of 175 million people.

The extremists began by asserting control over women’s bodies.

In the political vacuum that has emerged after the overthrow of Bangladesh’s authoritarian leader, religious fundamentalists in one town declared that young women could no longer play soccer. In another, they forced the police to free a man who had harassed a woman for not covering her hair in public, then draped him in garlands of flowers.

More brazen calls followed. Demonstrators at a rally in Dhaka, the capital, warned that if the government did not give the death penalty to anyone who disrespected Islam, they would carry out executions with their own hands. Days later, an outlawed group held a large march demanding an Islamic caliphate.

As Bangladesh tries to rebuild its democracy and chart a new future for its 175 million people, a streak of Islamist extremism that had long lurked beneath the country’s secular facade is bubbling to the surface.

In interviews, representatives of several Islamist parties and organizations — some of which had previously been banned — made clear that they were working to push Bangladesh in a more fundamentalist direction, a shift that has been little noticed outside the country.

The Islamist leaders are insisting that Bangladesh erect an “Islamic government” that punishes those who disrespect Islam and enforces “modesty” — vague concepts that in other places have given way to vigilantism or theocratic rule.

Officials across the political spectrum who are involved in drafting potential amendments to the Constitution acknowledged that the document was likely to drop secularism as a defining characteristic of Bangladesh, replacing it with pluralism and redrawing the country along more religious lines.

A banned group calling for an Islamic caliphate in Dhaka this month.Credit...Munir Uz Zaman/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The fundamentalist turn has been especially distressing for female students who helped oust the country’s repressive prime minister, Sheikh Hasina.

They had hoped to replace her one-party rule with a democratic openness that accommodates the country’s diversity. But now they find themselves competing against a religious populism that leaves women and religious minorities, including Hindus and adherents of small sects of Islam, particularly vulnerable.

“We were at the forefront of the protests. We protected our brothers on the street,” said Sheikh Tasnim Afroz Emi, 29, a sociology graduate from Dhaka University. “Now after five, six months, the whole thing turned around.”

Critics say the country’s interim government, led by the 84-year-old Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, has not pushed back hard enough against extremist forces. They accuse Mr. Yunus of being soft, lost in the weeds of democratic reforms, conflict-averse and unable to articulate a clear vision as extremists take up more public space.

His lieutenants describe a delicate balancing act: They must protect the right to free speech and protest after years of authoritarianism, but doing so provides an opening for extremist demands.

The police, who largely deserted after Ms. Hasina’s fall and remain demoralized, can no longer hold the line. The military, which has taken up some policing duties, is increasingly at odds with the interim government and the student movement, which wants to hold officers accountable for past atrocities.

What is beginning to happen in Bangladesh mirrors a wave of fundamentalism that has consumed the region.

Afghanistan has become an extreme ethno-religious state, depriving women of the most basic liberties. In Pakistan, Islamist extremists have exerted their will through violence for years. In India, an entrenched Hindu right wing has undermined the country’s traditions of secular democracy. Myanmar is gripped by Buddhist extremists overseeing a campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Nahid Islam, a student leader who was a government minister in Bangladesh’s interim administration before stepping away recently to lead a new political party, acknowledged “the fear is there” that the country will slip toward extremism.

But he is hopeful that despite changes in the Constitution, values like democracy, cultural diversity and an aversion to religious extremism can hold. “I don’t think a state can be built in Bangladesh that goes against those fundamental values,” he said.

Some point to a Bengali culture with a deep tradition of art and intellectual debate. Others find hope in the shape of the country’s economy.

Women are so integrated in Bangladesh’s economy — 37 percent are in the formal labor force, one of the highest rates in South Asia — that any efforts to force them back into the home could result in a backlash.

Extremist forces are trying to push their way into the picture after 15 years in which Ms. Hasina both suppressed and appeased them.

She ran a police state that cracked down on Islamist elements, including those closer to the mainstream that could pose a political challenge. At the same time, she tried to win over Islamist parties’ religiously conservative base by allowing thousands of unregulated Islamic religious seminaries and putting $1 billion toward building hundreds of mosques.

With Ms. Hasina gone, smaller extremist outfits that want to upend the system entirely, and more mainstream Islamist parties that want to work within the democratic system, appear to be converging on a shared goal of a more conservative Bangladesh.

The largest Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, sees a big opportunity. The party, which has significant business investments, is playing a long-term game, analysts and diplomats said. While it is unlikely to win an election expected at the end of the year, the party hopes to capitalize on the discrediting of mainstream secular parties.

Mia Golam Parwar, Jamaat’s general secretary, said the party wanted an Islamic welfare state. The closest model, in its mix of religion and politics, is Turkey, he said.

“Islam provides moral guidelines for both men and women in terms of behavior and ethics,” Mr. Parwar said. “Within these guidelines, women can take part in any profession — sports, singing, theater, judiciary, military and bureaucracy.”

In the current vacuum, however, men at the local level have been coming up with their own interpretations of Islamic governance.

In the farming town of Taraganj, a group of organizers decided last month to hold a soccer match between two teams of young women. The goal was to provide entertainment and inspire local girls.

But as preparations got underway, a town mosque leader, Ashraf Ali, proclaimed that women and girls should not be allowed to play soccer.

Sports organizers usually announce details of a game by sending loudspeakers tied to rickshaws around town. Mr. Ali matched them by sending his own speakers, warning people not to attend.

On Feb. 6, as the players were changing into their jerseys in classrooms turned into dressing rooms, local officials were holding a meeting about the game. Mr. Ali declared that he “would rather become a martyr than allow the match,” said Sirajul Islam, one of the organizers.

The local administration caved in, announcing the game’s cancellation and putting the area under curfew.

Taslima Aktar, 22, who had traveled four hours by bus to play in the match, said she had seen “a lot of cars, army and police,” who told the players that the match was off.

Ms. Aktar said that in her decade playing soccer, this was the first time she had faced such opposition.

“I am a bit afraid now of what could happen,” she said.

The organizers managed to carry out a women’s match a couple of weeks later, in the presence of dozens of security forces. But as a precaution, they asked the young women to wear stockings under their shorts.

With the preacher’s unrelenting threats, the organizers said they were not sure they would take the risk again.

During an interview, Mr. Ali, the mosque leader, beamed with pride: He had turned something mundane into something disputed. In a rural area like Taraganj, he said, women’s soccer contributes to “indecency.”

Women’s sports was just his latest cause. For years, he has preached and petitioned against the Ahmadiyya, a long-persecuted minority Muslim community, trying to drive its 500 members out of his area.

The Ahmadiyya’s place of worship was attacked by a mob on the night that Ms. Hasina’s government collapsed, part of a national wave of anarchy that targeted minority religious sites, particularly those of Hindus. The Ahmadiyya community continues to live in fear; attendance at their prayer hall has shrunk by nearly half.

They are not allowed to rebuild the hall’s destroyed sign or to broadcast their call to prayer from loudspeakers. Mr. Ali shrugged off any responsibility for the violence. But the sermons of preachers like him, declaring the Ahmadiyya heretics who need to be expelled, continue to blare.

“The public is respectful,” said A.K.M. Shafiqul Islam, the president of the local Ahmadiyya chapter. “But these religious leaders are against us.”

Mujib Mashal is the South Asia bureau chief for The Times, helping to lead coverage of India and the diverse region around it, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan.

The upsurge of radical and fundamentalist Islamic elements in Bangladesh

With radical Islamist groups regaining ground in Bangladesh after regime change, border vulnerabilities and anti-India rhetorics are on the rise.

The 55^th Director General-level border coordination conference (held 16-20 February 2025) between the Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) brought several issues to light. This was the first top-level meeting between the two border guarding forces after the ouster of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024. Trans-border crimes, attacks on BSF personnel and Indian civilians of border villages by Bangladesh-based miscreants, activities of Indian insurgent groups in Bangladesh, border infrastructure, construction of single-row fencing, and the Coordinated Border Management Plan were some of the issues that were discussed.

During the talks, the BGB reportedly objected to the BSF building a single-row fence (SRF) within 150 yards of the border, requesting a joint inspection and renegotiation of terms. However, the BSF, which is erecting SRF at approximately 90 points along the India-Bangladesh border, refused to revisit the terms, citing the joint record of discussions finalised earlier between the two border forces. Notably, the BGB’s objections emerged only after the change of regime in Dhaka.

The BGB’s recent posturing at the border and during the talks, along with the instability in Bangladesh, have highlighted emerging security challenges on India’s eastern frontier.

The BGB’s recent posturing at the border and during the talks, along with the instability in Bangladesh, have highlighted emerging security challenges on India’s eastern frontier. These include the rise of radical Islamist elements, which the Sheikh Hasina government had previously controlled effectively. More concerning is the growing anti-India rhetoric in the country.

Border vulnerabilities

The India-Bangladesh border remains vulnerable to exploitation by radical Islamic outfits and transnational criminal networks for infiltration and smuggling. Stretches of the border are sensitive due to the activities of Salafist elements. Bangladeshi Islamic preachers regularly visit the interiors of bordering districts like Malda, Murshidabad, and North 24 Parganas in West Bengal and participate in religious discourses. The growth of religious institutions along the border and attempts to change the orientation of religious practices in border areas have also been identified.

The ethnic composition and religious and linguistic similarities of the border population have made it easier for Bangladesh-based radical elements to assimilate with the local populace and attempt ingress. Over the years, illegal migration from Bangladesh has increased and has also affected the demographic profile of border districts in Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura. The growth in religious institutions and visits of fundamentalist preachers from Bangladesh, along with the proliferation of extremist literature in Bengali on social media, have impacted the border population and added to India’s security concerns.

Over the years, illegal migration from Bangladesh has increased and has also affected the demographic profile of border districts in Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura.

Neutralisation of terror modules of the proscribed Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) and their links to radical/fundamentalist entities in West Bengal, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh are indicative of the threat perception from Bangladesh-based terror groups. These groups exploit the shared religious and linguistic identity along the border to try to establish bases in West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura and expand their network to the hinterland.

Consolidation of Islamic radicals 

Following the August 2024 regime change, there has been an increase in the activities of anti-India terrorists and radical Islamic groups in Bangladesh. During the transition phase, several radicals and terrorists, including ABT Chief Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani, Ikramul Haque, Indian operations head of the ABT Jamat-ul-Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, Chief Shamim Mahfuz, and Sheikh Aslam, either escaped or were released. Consequently, Islamic radicals and terror entities are currently operating freely in Bangladesh. Golam Sarowar Rahat, the second-in-command of the banned JMB, was recently sighted with Bangladesh’s interim government head, Mohammad Yunus, while visiting the alleged secret detention centre Aynaghar in Dhaka.

Since August 2024, the JMB has enhanced its organisational activities and is also exploring aligning with the Hefazat-e-Islami (HeI), Bangladesh’s largest radical Islamic organisation. Maulana Mamunul Haque, Joint Secretary General of HeI, along with Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) Bangladesh, is working to establish a common platform for Islamic groups. Pakistani nationals also attended the recent meetings of this group. After the regime change, JeI revived and reasserted its presence. As per Indian security agencies’ assessment, the JeI, in recent meetings, has exhorted supporters to establish an Islamic state under the leadership of its chief, Shafiqur Rahman.

As per Indian security agencies’ assessment, the JeI, in recent meetings, has exhorted supporters to establish an Islamic state under the leadership of its chief, Shafiqur Rahman.

The Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), a pro-Caliphate transnational radical Islamic organisation, which played a key role in the regime change, has also emerged from the shadows to organise nationwide demonstrations, including a ‘March for Khilafat’ rally in Dhaka on 7 March 2025. HuT cadres are backed by some advisers of the interim government, such as Asif Nazrul, Nahid Islam, Asif Mahmud Sajeeb Bhuiyan, and Mehfuz Alam. Nasimul Gani, one of the founder members of HuT, was appointed Home Secretary. Despite being banned, HuT is allowed to assert its Caliphate ideology in public spaces. Its recruitment targets educated youth seeking to exploit the current dissatisfaction with secular governance by offering a radical Islamist alternative of a Caliphate. Its activities have also been noted in India, where it was recently proscribed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Investigations by the National Investigation Agency have indicated that HuT has a presence in some urban areas in Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, and West Bengal, where it is involved in radicalising vulnerable youths.

Another important development is the revival of the Al-Qaeda-linked Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-Bangladesh (HuJI-B), a terrorist group that had been dormant for around a decade. HuJI-B has penetrated the HeI, and several Qawmi madrassas are now pro-HuJI. Moreover, post-regime change, it has increased its social media footprint.

Other concerns

An additional cause of concern is the presence of over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, as they are prone to radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist groups. The Pakistan-backed Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army is trying to gain control over some refugee camps to strengthen its links with the drug-smuggling crime syndicate and build a dedicated cadre of radicalised Rohingyas who can be used to target India at an opportune time. Further, Rohingya refugees in crowded camps seeking better living conditions often attempt to escape from Cox’s Bazaar and Bhashan Char Island through maritime and land routes, including by infiltrating into India via Tripura, Assam, and West Bengal.

The Pakistan-backed Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army is trying to gain control over some refugee camps to strengthen its links with the drug-smuggling crime syndicate and build a dedicated cadre of radicalised Rohingyas who can be used to target India at an opportune time.

In Bangladesh, the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) remains volatile due to internecine conflict among ethnic groups. The systematic settlement of Bengali Muslim settlers by Bangladeshi security forces has altered the demography of CHT. The volatile situation in the CHT has security implications for India as the region borders Tripura and Mizoram. Indian insurgent groups, which are under pressure in the Myanmar Naga Hills due to the Myanmar Army’s operations, may try to set up their bases in CHT.

The resurgence of radical Islamist groups is also manifesting in the growing number of attacks being reported on religious minorities across Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh’s regime continues to be in denial about atrocities against minorities. Unsurprisingly, BGB Director General Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman categorically denied any attacks on minorities in the recent past, alleging that such news is merely media exaggeration. 

Increasing Pakistan footprints

These dynamics are closely aligned with the changing contours of Bangladesh-Pakistan ties. Since the regime change, Bangladesh has moved closer to Pakistan. There has also been an upswing in the two countries’ military, diplomatic, and trade relations. Pakistan and Bangladesh have resumed direct trade for the first time since 1971, with the first cargo departing from Port Qasim. A Bangladeshi delegation, led by Lt Gen SM Kamrul Hasan, travelled to Pakistan on 13-18 January 2025 and met top military leaders, including Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir. Further, Bangladesh allowed a delegation from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), led by Major General Shahid Amir Afsar, to visit sensitive areas near the Indian border in January 2025.

Indian security agencies have indicated that Pakistan-based terrorist outfits like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and HuJI are by exploiting the regime change to revive their connections with Bangladesh-based radical and terror groups to launch anti-India activities.

ISI’s attempts to establish a foothold in strategic areas of Bangladesh is a move fraught with danger for India. Pakistan’s strategy also involves encouraging the Islamic identity as a key variable in Bangladeshi politics. Indian security agencies have indicated that Pakistan-based terrorist outfits like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and HuJI are by exploiting the regime change to revive their connections with Bangladesh-based radical and terror groups to launch anti-India activities.

Prognosis

A consolidation of Islamic elements is underway in Bangladesh after the recent regime change. Aimed at further Islamisation of Bangladesh, Islamic organisations are working to establish a common platform to seize power and discredit India. The prevailing anti-India sentiment will be exploited by radical Islamic forces in Bangladesh and inimical forces like Pakistan to target India and Indian interests in the region. The current instability in Bangladesh poses a serious challenge to border management and larger national security

Bangladesh’s Evolving Security Crisis: The Rise of Religious Extremism Amid Political Transition

From January to May 2025, Bangladesh witnessed a rise in religious extremism, worsened by ongoing political instability. This has increased intolerance towards minorities, secular voices and women’s rights. The growth of hardline groups and mob violence targeting those seen as “un-Islamic” signals a worsening security situation. The interim government, facing leadership challenges, has struggled to effectively counter radicalisation. There is also growing concern about Bangladeshi youth being radicalised, including online, by transnational extremist groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Experts warn that without stronger surveillance and more inclusive governance, Bangladesh risks deeper societal divisions, with wider implications for regional instability.

Photo- Berlin Gate, Germany..

Photo Credit - SJ

Introduction

Bangladesh went through significant political upheaval in 2024 that led to the overthrow of the then ruling Awami League[1]regime led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The resulting security vacuum led to widespread chaos, including public demonstrations, mass prison escapes, looted weapons and a breakdown in law enforcement. Local media, for example, reported that police stations were deserted in the upheaval, and subsequently attacked and ransacked by mobs. Strikingly, over 5,800 weapons and 300,000 rounds of ammunition were looted from police stations in Bangladesh. Extremist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) and local actors such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) have also swiftly exploited this disorder, spreading radical ideologies, targeting youth and inciting violence against minorities. At least 70 militants were among the 2,200 prison escapees.

In the aftermath, religious extremism has regained traction.[2]Many previously arrested terrorists are currently active online, including on platforms like Facebook (Meta) and YouTube. Some have claimed that law enforcement agencies under the previous administration detained them illegitimately for political reasons and subjected them to harassment.[3] This narrative has been amplified by many individuals in the current political and administrative spheres, who have also purported that the arrests of many previously apprehended terrorists were fabricated. Taken together, this situation has undermined public trust in law enforcement and the justice system, potentially emboldening extremist groups and complicating future counter terrorism efforts.

While there have been no major terrorist attacks, the concerning surge in mob violence[4] has been accompanied by threats against minority groups and secular voices and the overt display of extremist symbols.[5] Banned hardline organisations like HT and Ansar al Islam are reportedly reassembling, with many of their leaders now released.[6]Moreover, the renewed push to recruit Bangladeshi youth by transnational terror groups has led to a rising number aligning with groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.[7] In their outreach efforts, these groups are leveraging digital platforms to target vulnerable youth.[8]

This article posits that extremist groups are effectively exploiting weakened counter terrorism efforts by state actors, driven by leadership transitions, institutional weaknesses and a critical lack of focus within counter terrorism agencies. Drawing from publicly available sources, this analysis concludes that without immediate, community-driven prevention efforts and a stronger institutional focus, Bangladesh risks deepening societal polarisation and long-term security instability.

Key Trends in Religious Extremism

Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in 2024, Islamist political groups have re-emerged with renewed vigour. They include Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh (HIB), an influential hardline organisation of Qawmi madrassa teachers and students.[9] These groups are now positioning themselves to enter parliament in the 2026 elections, advocating for the implementation of shariah law, including the death penalty for blasphemy.[10] A massive rally organised by HIB on May 3, 2025, in Dhaka, which drew thousands of attendees, demonstrated their expanding influence and signalled a more significant role for these hardline groups in Bangladesh’s political future. This event, described as one of their largest public shows of strength in years, demonstrated their mobilisation capabilities and renewed assertiveness.

Their rise has raised alarm, especially among women,[11]religious minorities and secular communities, who fear efforts to suppress cultural activities and remove secular literature. In April 2025, a theatre performance of Shesher Kobita, a famous novel by Nobel Prize winner Rabindranath Tagore, was cancelled in Dhaka after an Islamist vigilante group called Tawhidi Janata made threats.[12] A similar incident happened on May 19, 2025, in Madhupur, Tangail – a folk festival honouring Lalon, a well-known Bengali mystic and musician, was cancelled after HIB said Lalon’s beliefs were against Islam. Despite the organisers providing assurances that no controversial songs or messages would be featured, the event was still cancelled to avoid violence.[13]

Additionally, these hardline groups are aligning with other opposition forces like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, creating a potentially formidable bloc in the lead-up to the 2026 national elections. Their growing influence signals a potential shift towards a more conservative and religiously governed state, with possible further implications for freedom of expression, minority rights and gender equality. Additionally, the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus has struggled to mount an effective counterresponse, and local leaders have begun imposing restrictions such as blocking women’s soccer games. Jamaat-e-Islami is also aiming to capitalise on public disillusionment with secular politics, presenting itself as a viable alternative.[14]

“Moral Policing”

During Ramadan 2025 in Bangladesh, several incidents of “moral policing” occurred where individuals and food vendors were harassed, shamed or forced to close their businesses for operating during daylight hours.[15] These actions, often captured on video and shared online, have been linked to members or sympathisers of Islamist political groups, such as Islami Andolon Bangladesh and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, though the parties have denied involvement. Human rights groups and Islamic scholars have condemned these acts, stating they spread fear, misrepresent religious teachings and infringe on basic rights – especially for non-Muslims, the elderly and the ill. Despite public outcry, law enforcement has largely failed to take firm action, leading to criticism of administrative inaction and growing concern over individuals taking the law into their own hands.[16]

Normalisation of Extremist Narratives

Since the fall of the Awami League government on August 5, 2024, there has also been a noticeable increase in the public display of symbols linked to internationally designated terrorist groups, including flags of the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ). Protesters have also carried images of extremist leaders, such as Osama bin Laden, portraying them as heroic figures.

A notable instance occurred during a rally in Dhaka on April 7, held in protest against Israeli actions in Gaza, where IS flags and a portrait of bin Laden were prominently displayed.[17]These incidents reinforce concerns of radical elements exploiting both domestic political shifts and international grievances to gain visibility and legitimacy. While the public display of terrorist symbols by some protesters does not signify widespread national acceptance of extremist narratives, it risks normalising these ideologies and making them more accessible to a wider audience.

Controversial Bail Releases of Terrorism Suspects

In another blow to public confidence in the country’s security and legal apparatuses, over 300 individuals accused of terrorist and extremist activities in Bangladesh have been released on bail since last August, sparking mixed reactions.[18] While some argue that many were ‘wrongfully’ detained under the previous government, others believe that hardline extremists have exploited the situation. Among the released are members of banned groups like Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), with Mufti Jasimuddin Rahmani, who is accused of leading the latter, claiming that the group “never existed”.[19] Families of victims have expressed dismay, highlighting the emotional and social toll of these releases. Politically, the government faces criticism for being lenient on terrorism, and the releases may tarnish Bangladesh’s international reputation if extremists regain influence.

Evolving Alliance of Educated and Traditional Hardline Figures

Extremism is evolving, marked by a notable collaboration between traditional religious figures and mainstream educated hardliners who are increasingly spreading its messages.[20]This trend is supported by earlier observations from various counter-extremism bodies noting an uptick in individuals with mainstream educational backgrounds engaging in propaganda and radicalisation efforts.[21] These actors use their academic credentials, digital platforms and emotionally charged global issues – such as the Palestine conflict – to frame violent ideologies as moral imperatives. By presenting radical views through the language of intellectual discourse, they are able to engage younger, urban and educated audiences who might previously have been considered less vulnerable to such influence.

This shift reflects a more sophisticated and adaptive form of extremism, expanding its reach and complicating traditional approaches to detection and prevention. Bangladeshi observers note that that while mainstream educated students and young professionals have been active for more than a decade, under the previous administration they were operating in isolation or in silos. Since the regime change in August 2024, however, these individuals have been coming together and forming alliances on common platforms, with SEAN Publication being a prominent example.[22]

Re-Emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB)

Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB), banned since 2009, is rapidly regaining influence by recruiting youth through social media and educational institutions, exploiting grievances such as high unemployment and political instability. A large rally in Dhaka in March 2025, attended by over 2,000 supporters, showcased the group’s bold defiance of state authority and its call for an Islamic caliphate.[23] Despite the ban, HTB continues to grow, spreading extremist ideology and attempting to infiltrate the military and state institutions. The group’s activities have come under scrutiny, particularly as it promotes jihadist narratives like Ghazwatul Hind.[24] HTB’s presence in Bangladesh has expanded considerably in recent years, particularly among youth. The group now has an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 members in the country.[25] While it originally concentrated on recruiting university students, it has since broadened its focus to include high school and junior college students. HTB actively engages with young audiences, leveraging social media to promote extremist ideologies and attract new members by playing on emotions and misrepresenting Islamic history.

Bangladeshi observers anticipate a surge in activities by HTB, particularly around the 2026 elections.[26] While HTB primarily advocates for the establishment of a caliphate through non-violent means, its heightened presence and rhetoric during a politically charged period could significantly impact the environment. Its ideological campaigning could contribute to the radicalisation of individuals, even if it does not directly endorse violence. The group might leverage the electoral environment to amplify its message of political and social change, potentially attracting new followers. For some, exposure to HTB’s ideology might even serve as a stepping stone to involvement with violent extremism.[27] While HTB has not resorted to violence (at least not in the way terrorist organisations do) to achieve its goals, some of its members have shown a willingness to use violence if necessary, even supporting the idea of punishing or killing those they see as blasphemers.[28]

Foreign Fighters and Transnational Radicalisation

An investigative report published by Bangladeshi digital outlet The Dissent on May 15, 2025, revealed that several Bangladeshi youths have joined the TTP and are actively engaged in militant activities along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.[29] Among them, a 22-year-old youth was reportedly killed during a Pakistani military operation in North Waziristan, having reached Afghanistan via Saudi Arabia after participating in missionary work through Tablighi Jamaat. His death was confirmed through anonymous calls to family and social media posts from TTP-linked accounts, which also attracted interest from other Bangladeshi users expressing a desire to follow the same path.[30] Another Bangladeshi fighter claimed in an interview to be based in Kabul, stating that at least eight nationals are currently active with the TTP, with three already having been killed. The Bangladeshi authorities acknowledged a lack of updated intelligence on these individuals, underscoring how online radicalisation and transnational networks continue to exploit gaps in surveillance and counter terrorism focus.[31]

This development further highlights the need for Bangladesh to strengthen digital monitoring, community engagement and regional cooperation to prevent the outflow of vulnerable youth into global extremist movements. It is noteworthy that back in 2023, the Italian police arrested a Bangladeshi man in Genoa (northwest Italy) suspected of links to the AQ-linked TTP, accusing him of promoting jihadist violence online and preparing for militant combat.^[32] Sources within the Bangladeshi security services have indicated that some Bangladeshi pro-AQ extremists are in communication with the TTP.

State Response

While the interim government upholds a zero-tolerance policy and continues to monitor released individuals, law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh have been slow to respond effectively. Key counter terrorism units, such as the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) Unit of Dhaka Metropolitan Police and the Anti Terrorism Unit (ATU), have faced challenges due to shifts in priorities, resource constraints and a focus on conventional crimes over extremist threats. The reassignment of experienced officers and internal coordination issues have further compromised their capacity to address the rise in extremism. Security analysts warn that this complacency could pave the way for more serious threats. Public confidence in the government’s anti-terrorism efforts is waning, especially as past operations are increasingly seen as performative.[33] The perceived lack of transparency in law enforcement and judicial processes, combined with a weak institutional response, has further exacerbated the issue.

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s ongoing political instability, coupled with weakened counter terrorism capacities, has created a conducive environment for the resurgence of religious extremism. The increasing influence of hardline groups, the growing involvement of Bangladeshi youth in transnational extremist movements and the normalisation of extremist rhetoric, particularly online, are indicators of a deeper security concern. If the interim government fails to implement swift and decisive measures to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance counter-radicalisation efforts and foster community-based engagement, the country risks further societal fragmentation and the entrenchment of violent extremism. The preservation of Bangladesh’s democratic and pluralistic values hinges on comprehensive institutional reforms and a renewed commitment to inclusivity, human rights and the rule of law. Without these, Bangladesh may face prolonged instability with implications for both national and regional security.

About the Author 

Iftekharul Bashar is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at isiftekharul@ntu.edu.sg.

Thumbnail photo by Austin Curtis on Unsplash

Citations

[1] The Bangladesh Awami League, the nation’s oldest political party, was instrumental in Bangladesh’s gaining of independence from Pakistan in 1971. In May 2025, Bangladesh’s interim government banned the Awami League and its associated organisations, citing national security, a move the party disputes as illegitimate.

[2] Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 17, no. 1, (2025): 54-58, https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/bangladesh-2/.

[3] “Sacked Major Zia Applies for Withdrawal of Cases,” The Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/sacked-major-zia-applies-withdrawal-cases-3792041.

[4] On April 7, 2025, protests erupted across Bangladesh condemning Israeli actions in Gaza. Demonstrators targeted Israeli-linked businesses like Bata, KFC and Pizza Hut, vandalising storefronts in cities including Bogra, Sylhet, Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. Protesters called for a boycott of Israeli products and urged action from the government and the United Nations (UN). For details, see “Mobs Target KFC, Bata as Nationwide Protests Condemn Israeli Aggression,” Dhaka Tribune, April 7, 2025, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/378099/nationwide-protest-condemn-israeli-aggression-mob; “Gaza Protests: Demonstrators Attack Bata, KFC Outlets in 6 Districts in Bangladesh,” bdnews24.com, April 7, 2025, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/c72cace94142.

[5] Mukimul Ahsan, “Who Is Marching with the Black Flag Inscribed with the Kalema?” BBC News, October 7, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/c748wqp9d29o; Nuruzzaman Labu, “Marches with ISIS and Al-Qaeda Flags Tarnish Image,” Bangla Tribune, April 11, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3c94uzab.

[6] Nuruzzaman Labu, “Marches with ISIS and al-Qaeda Flags Tarnish Image,” Bangla Tribune, April 11, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3c94uzab.

[7] Hasan Al Mahmud, “Bangladeshi Youths Are Fighting on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border for the Taliban,” The Dissent, May 15, 2025,  https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122113173014843347&id=61575300411283&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=eln21VVm2JH3dKxA#.

[8] In Bangladesh, the current wave of online radicalisation uniquely targets tech-savvy, often educated youth through localised, emotionally charged narratives on mainstream and encrypted platforms, exploiting socio-political grievances and a desire for purpose. Extremist groups leverage the ubiquity of Facebook, YouTube and WhatsApp to disseminate highly professional propaganda, making their messaging resonate deeply with vulnerable segments of the population.

[9] Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh (HIB) is a hardline outfit comprising Qawmi madrassa teachers and students. The Manhajis, a pro-Al-Qaeda Islamist cleric group, have allegedly embedded themselves within HIB.

[10] “Islamist Parties Seek Unity Before Election to Enforce Sharia Law,” Dhaka Tribune, May 4, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/3cbnutnv.

[11] Zia Chowdhury and Jesmin Papri, “Hardliners Increasingly Target Bangladeshi Women for Attire, Playing Sports – and Riding Motorcycles,” Benar News, March 27, 2025, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/moral-policing-of-women-rises-in-bangladesh-03272025145130.html.

[12] Even though the organisers had all the required permits, they cancelled the show because the authorities could not guarantee their safety. See “‘Tawhidi Janata’ Sends Letter to Stop Theatre Performance at Mohila Samiti Stage,” Dhaka Tribune, April 13, 2025, https://bangla.dhakatribune.com/entertainment/95171.

[13] These cases point to a disturbing pattern: extremist groups are using threats to control what types of art and culture can be shared, and the government is not doing enough to stop it due to fears of public backlash. Calling music, plays or festivals “un-Islamic” is becoming a common way to silence different voices. The concern is that extremist ideas are gaining power in public life and limiting freedom of expression in the country.

[14] Mujib Mashal and Saif Hasnat. “As Bangladesh Reinvents Itself, Islamist Hard-Liners See an Opening,” The New York Times, April 1, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/01/world/asia/bangladesh-islam.html.

[15] “Eating at a Hotel During the Day Results in the Punishment of Holding One’s Ears and Doing Squats,” Samakal, March 13, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/2ut7np38; Tarikuzzaman Shimul, “Who Are the Ones Engaging in ‘Moral Policing’ in the Name of Protecting the Sanctity of Ramadan?” BBC News, March 13, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/cx20yd5d1g3o.

[16] Shimul, “Who Are the Ones Engaging in ‘Moral Policing’.”

[17] Labu, “Marches with ISIS and Al-Qaeda Flags.”

[18] Abul Kalam Azad, “Jihadism Accused Released on Bail, ‘Many Have Repented after Misunderstanding’, Says Rahmani,” BBC News, April 11, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/c3v95kkvq2no.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Author’s interview with a Bangladeshi security official, June 2025.

[21] Author’s field research in Bangladesh, April 2024.

[22] Established in 2013, SEAN Publication produces books and organises public events, among other activities, to propagate radicalism with the primary goal of engaging educated young audiences in dakwah activities across various platforms. Among those it has published are radical individuals with post-graduate credentials who also operate outside of Bangladesh, as observed by the author.

[23] “Police Tell Court, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir Wants to Destroy the Democratic Government and Establish Extremism’,” Kalbela, March 8, 2025, https://www.kalbela.com/court-law/170156.

[24] In some extremist interpretations, Ghazwatul Hind (or “Battle of Hind”) refers to an apocalyptic holy war prophesied in certain Islamic texts, which envisions a final, decisive battle between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Indian subcontinent. It is often invoked by jihadist groups to promote violent conflict and justify attacks in the region.

[25] Iftekharul Bashar, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh: A Growing Threat and the Need for Action,” RSIS Commentary no. 62 (2025), https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CO25062.pdf.

[26] Author’s interview with a Bangladeshi security analyst, June 2025.

[27] “Farabi Gets 7yr Jail in ICT case,” Somoy News, January 30, 2023, https://en.somoynews.tv/news/2023-01-30/farabi-gets-7yr-jail-in-ict-case.

[28] Bashar, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh.”

[29] Al Mahmud, “Bangladeshi Youths Are Fighting.”

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] “Bangladeshi Arrested in Italy on Suspicion of Al-Qaeda Links,” The Daily Star, November 4, 2023, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/world/europe/news/bangladeshi-arrested-italy-suspicion-al-qaeda-links-3460881.

[33] Labu, “Marches with ISIS and Al-Qaeda.